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1199 
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A MINOR CHILD 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, PALM 
BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 
INTRODUCTION 
If you are a man who has had anonymous sex and are interested in 
parenting a child that may have been conceived from this random 
union—do not despair, the Florida legislature recently passed a new 
adoption law that protects your rights.  In March of 2001, the Florida 
State Legislature passed sweeping amendments to Florida’s adoption 
laws.1  The most controversial of these laws has been named the 
“Scarlet Letter” law by many of its opponents.2  In a nutshell, if a 
mother who is placing her child for adoption does not know who her 
baby’s father is, and she has exhausted avenues of finding him, she 
must place a notice in the local newspaper in the county where the 
baby was conceived.3  This notice must include her name, a 
                                                          
 1. See  H.R. 141, 103rd  Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (showing that both houses voted 
in March 2001), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm; see also 
Shelby Oppel, Senate Okays Adoption Changes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, 
at 1A (listing the new changes, which include giving birth mothers three days to 
revoke consent to adoption of a child who is not an infant; requiring a “diligent 
search” for birth fathers; and giving birth fathers who claim fraud two years to 
challenge an adoption).  Other amendments within the bill include the creation of a 
forty-eight hour waiting period before a birth mother can release a child for adoption 
and preventing courts from finding that a birth father abandoned his child simply 
because he did not give the birth mother “emotional support” during her pregnancy.  
Id. 
 2. See, e.g., Al Neuharth, ‘Scarlet’ or Adoption for Unwed Mothers?, 
USATODAY.com, Aug. 15, 2002 (arguing that the new Florida law stigmatizes unwed 
women or teenage girls who wish to put their child up for adoption as did the fabled 
scarlet “A” from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s classic novel), available at http://www. 
usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/2002-08-15-neuharth_x.htm; Daniel de Vise, 
Suit Attacks Adoption Law Requiring Sex Details in Ads, THE MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9, 
2002, at 1A  (highlighting feminist leaders’ characterization of the new law as “a 
humiliation to women everywhere, a modern-day Scarlet Letter”).  See generally 
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 47-55 (Penguin Books 2003) (1850) 
(detailing the public ridicule of Hester Prynne, required by law to wear a red “A” 
upon her bosom for the sin of adultery and unwed pregnancy). 
 3. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5) (2001) (requiring constructive notice where the 
location and identity of the father are unknown); see also Jon Burstein, Moms 
Challenge New Adoption Laws; Women Fear Ads Naming Sex Partners, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL (Palm Beach County, Fla.), Aug. 7, 2002, at 1A (noting that when 
background searches are unsuccessful, the birth mother must place notice in the 
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description of herself, a name and/or description of the possible 
father, the date and the city or county of conception.4 
The law, which took effect in October 2001,5 has been highly 
controversial.6  One critic stated “it invades privacy and brands 
women with a ‘scarlet letter’ by making them divulge embarrassing 
intimate sexual details.”7  This same opponent even hypothesized 
what an “ad” in the newspaper would look like: “Jane Smith, 31, 
brown hair, brown eyes, seeking 30-something man, blond hair, blue 
eyes, mole on right cheek, who spent last Nov. 20 in Rural Route 44 
motel after drinks at sports bar next door.  May have fathered child.”8  
Regardless, proponents of the new law say it provides finality to 
adoption proceedings.9  Another supporter believes that this law 
finally acknowledges “the problem birth fathers nationwide face in 
preventing adoptions that they don’t want or, in many cases, don’t 
even know are happening.”10 
Governor Jeb Bush, in an unsigned letter to the legislature, also 
entered into the debate, supporting the bill because it would increase 
the finality of adoptions.11  He stated that he recognizes the law may 
                                                          
newspaper). 
 4. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5). 
 5. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.087, 63.088. 
 6. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 3 (noting that legislators were aware at the time 
of passage that the bill would probably attract attention, particularly from adoption 
attorneys). 
 7. Geraldine Sealey, Florida’s ‘Scarlet Letter’: Controversial Adoption Law Pits 
Women’s Privacy, Fathers’ Rights, ABCNEWS.com, Aug. 20, 2002 (comparing critics 
who find the law “an anachronistic injustice,” with supporters who welcome the 
“attempt to secure paternal privileges.”), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/ 
DailyNews/fathersrights 020820.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Juleyka Lantigua, Progressive Media Project, Florida Adoption Law 
Humiliates Women, Aug. 28, 2002 (quoting Senator Walter Campbell, who stated 
that without the law, “we have potential biological fathers coming back and taking 
children out of adoptive parents’ hands”), available at http://www.progressive.org/ 
Media%20Project%202/mpla2802.html.  See generally de Vise, supra note 2 
(quoting Senator Campbell as stating that the intent behind the bill was “to prevent 
disruptive legal attacks from biological fathers after an adoption is final, not to subject 
mothers to public humiliation”). 
 10. Jeffrey Leving, New Adoption Law Correctly Requires Mothers to Publish 
Sexual Pasts, Says Fatherhood Educational Institute, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 13, 2002 
(commending the Florida legislature and Governor Jeb Bush for acknowledging birth 
fathers’ rights), available at http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/search5/0813-
139.html.  Leving argues that adoption laws should not ignore biological fathers’ 
rights “simply because it’s more convenient.”  Id. 
 11. See Unsigned Letter from Governor Jeb Bush, State of Florida, to Secretary 
Katherine Harris 1 (Apr. 17, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Unsigned 
Letter] (“House Bill 141 begins with the premise that we should bring more certainty 
to Florida’s adoption procedures and laws.  This certainty is designed to provide 
greater finality once the adoption is approved, and to avoid circumstances where 
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not be perfect;12 however, Governor Bush rationalized the adoption 
bill by discussing the need to balance the rights of three interested 
parties: “the birth mother, the birth father, and the adoptive 
parents.”13  He also noted the state’s responsibility to ensure “the 
child’s safety, well-being, and permanency.”14  Finally, Governor Bush 
conceded that the statute “provides some comfort as well as 
discomfort for all groups involved in the process.”15 
The primary proponent of the bill, Senator Walter Campbell, 
brought the legislation forward in order to discourage disruptions in 
the adoption process.16  Although there was sparse opposition to the 
bill, opponents were adamant that there were inherent problems with 
the new procedures.17  The bill ultimately passed both houses of the 
Florida legislature with ease,18 and the unsigned letter from Governor 
Bush was attached to the bill when it was adopted.19 
The most important debate on the law has taken place in a Palm 
Beach County Court.  On May 20, 2002, attorneys Charlotte Danciu 
and Lynn G. Waxman filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment, 
challenging the constitutionality of Florida Statute sections 63.087 
and 63.088.20  The Motion challenged the Florida laws as a violation 
                                                          
future challenges to the adoption disrupt the life of the child.”). 
 12. See id. at 3-4 (quoting Ben Franklin at the constitutional convention stating: 
“I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the convention who may still 
have objections to it would with me on this occasion doubt a little of his own 
infallibility. . . .”). 
 13. Id. at 1. But see Y.H. v. F.L.H., 784 So. 2d 565, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(Polston, J., dissenting) (identifying the three parties who can claim “competing 
constitutional interests” in an adoption battle between adoptive parents and a 
maternal grandmother as the adoptive parents, birth mother and child). 
 14. Unsigned Letter, supra note 11, at 1.  See generally Ramey v. Thomas, 382 So. 
2d 78, 80-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that in all proceedings regarding child 
custody, the “best-interest and welfare of the child” must be the primary focus). 
 15. Unsigned Letter, supra note 11, at 1. 
 16. See de Vise, supra note 2. 
 17. See, e.g., Oppel, supra note 1 (quoting Senator Bill Posey, who stated: “I just 
truly and in my heart think we’re going in the wrong direction. . . .”). 
 18. See H.R. 141, 103rd Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (showing the vote: the House of 
Representatives voted 104 to eight in favor of the bill and the Senate voted thirty to 
eight in favor of the bill). 
 19. See id; see also Oppel, supra note 1 (explaining that Governor Bush had 
seven days after the passage of the bill to veto, sign, or allow it to become law without 
his signature—he chose the last option.) 
 20. Pl’s. Mot. for Declaratory J. at 1, In re: Adoption of a Minor (citation omitted) 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002) (docket no. omitted) (redacted version on file with author) 
[hereinafter Motion] (contending that the required publication violates both the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, section 23 of 
the Florida Constitution).  Information about the law offices of Charlotte H. Danciu, 
located in Boca Raton, Florida, is available at http://www.adoption-surrogacy.com/ 
aboutus.htm. 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
the Florida Constitution.21  Interestingly, the Florida Attorney 
General opted not to defend the statute in question.22  On July 24, 
2002, Circuit Court Judge Peter D. Blanc issued an Order that 
partially granted, but mainly denied plaintiffs’ Motion.23  The 
following is an analysis of the Florida Adoption law and the Fifteenth 
Circuit’s holding. 
I. FLORIDA ADOPTION LAW 
The Florida Adoption Act requires a petition and hearing to 
terminate the parental rights by both the biological mother and 
father before the adoption.24  Under the amended law, if the father is 
unknown or cannot be located at the time of the petition, the mother 
must publish a petition and notice of hearing in the newspaper in 
“each city in which the mother resided or traveled, in which 
conception may have occurred, during the 12 months before the 
minor’s birth.”25 
Section 63.088 sets forth requirements for notice, service, and the 
diligent search of a biological father, in order to terminate his 
parental rights.26  If these inquiries fail to illuminate a birth father’s 
identity, a notice must be published in the newspaper.27  According to 
the new amendments,28 this notice must contain: 
                                                          
 21. See id. at 5-6 (illustrating the similarities in the right to privacy articulated in 
the federal and Florida constitutions); see also infra Part III. 
 22. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Mot. to Declare Florida 
Statute Sections 63.087 and 63.088 Unconstitutional at 1, In re: Adoption of a Minor 
Child (citation omitted) (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2002) (docket no. omitted) (redacted version 
on file with author) [hereinafter Order] (noting that the state did not respond to the 
plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment); see also Jane Sutton, Sex History Law 
Looks Set to Be Dumped, REUTERS, Feb. 20, 2003 (explaining that, on appeal, 
Attorney General Charles Crist would not defend the adoption statute, as passage of 
the bill and the Circuit Court’s decision took place before he came into office), at 
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=oddlyEnoughNew&storyID=226048; 
see also id. (quoting plaintiffs’ attorney Danciu stating: “It speaks loudly . . . that the 
attorney general’s office doesn’t believe this statute is worth defending.”). 
 23. Order, supra note 22, at 19-20. 
 24. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.087 (2001) (setting forth the administrative procedures 
and outlining the contents of a petition to terminate parental rights); see also Order, 
supra note 22, at 4 (describing the required procedure of termination of parental 
rights prior to the filing of an adoption petition). 
 25. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.087(b)(f).  See, e.g., Example Petition and Notice for Filing 
in Local Newspaper (on file with author). 
 26. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(2), (4) (2002) (including procedures that apply 
when the father’s location and identity are known and unknown). 
 27. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5). 
 28. See generally de Vise, supra note 2 (noting that the previous adoption law 
required a much simpler notice to unknown fathers, including only the baby’s date 
4
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[A] physical description including, but not limited to, age, race, 
hair and eye color, and approximate height and weight of the 
minor’s mother and of any person the mother reasonably believes 
may be the father, the minor’s date of birth; and any date and city, 
including the county and state in which the city is located, in which 
conception may have occurred.29 
Before a court will proceed with the termination of parental rights 
and the adoption, an affidavit of constructive service must be filed 
with the court.30  To achieve constructive service as required by the 
statute,31 the above information must be published in the county 
where the court is located once a week for four consecutive weeks.32 
II. PLAINTIFFS 
The constitutional challenge was brought on behalf of six plaintiffs.  
In the Order, the court explains each plaintiff’s factual scenario: 
[A] is a [minor] child33 who was raped by an adult male of 
approximately twenty seven years of age.  The male’s name is 
known, but his whereabouts are unknown to the birthmother, as 
well as the police.  The mother gave birth to a child and wishes to 
place him for adoption.  Sections 63.087 and 63.088 requires 
publication of the child/victim’s name in the newspaper for the 
adoption to be completed; 
                                                          
and place of birth). 
 29.  FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5) (requiring that unknown or unascertainable facts be 
indicated within the notice petition).  See generally Motion, supra note 20, at 6-7 
(noting that FL. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 sets forth strict confidentiality requirements in 
adoption proceedings).  However, under the 2001 amendments, these requirements 
were waived for information required in Section 63.088.  Id. at 7. 
 30. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(2) (2001) (“Before the court may determine that a 
minor is available for adoption . . . each person whose consent is required . . . must be 
personally served.”); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.088(5) (stating that “the unlocated or 
unidentified person must be served notice under subsection (2) by constructive 
service”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.089(2)(d) (West 2003) (“The court may hold the 
hearing [to terminate the father’s rights] only when . . . all affidavits of inquiry, 
diligent search, and service required under section 63.088 have been obtained and 
filed with the court.”).  See, e.g., Aff. of Don Morgan, Legal Advertising 
Representative at 1 (Jul. 22, 2002) (on file with author) (attaching an actual 
advertisement that ran in the Tallahassee Democrat). 
 31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 49.011(10) (West 2003). 
 32. FLA. STAT. ch. 49.011(10), 49.10(1). 
 33. Depending upon the Florida statute involved, a minor may be under the age 
of sixteen or eighteen.  Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 2001) (defining a 
minor as a person who is sixteen or seventeen years old), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
800.04 (West 2003) (criminalizing lewd conduct with persons under sixteen years 
old). 
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[B] is a [minor] child34 who now resides . . . in Florida . . . and had 
sexual relations with numerous classmates.  Subsequently, she gave 
birth to an infant . . . and placed her for adoption with family 
friends.  Sections 63.087 and 63.088 require publication of the 
minor’s name, description, location of conception and 
circumstances of conception in [B’s] hometown newspaper to 
effectuate notice to a possible birth father; 
[C] is a single woman in her late twenties.  She has had an on again, 
off again drug problem.  During a period of ‘using’ she had sexual 
relations with other drug users.  She has no idea of the identity or 
whereabouts of the possible father.  She subsequently entered 
rehab and gave birth to a drug free baby.  She is working.  She 
wishes for her child to be adopted.  Sections 63.087 and 63.088 
require [C’s] name, description and the whereabouts and 
circumstances of conception to be published in the newspaper; 
[D] is a single woman in her twenties and a former foster child. . . .  
She has had numerous35 sex partners and has an alcohol abuse 
problem.  She is currently working. 
[E] is a single woman in her thirties. . . .  She alleges she was slipped 
a ‘date rape’ drug at a bar and was assaulted by three unknown 
men.  Sections 63.087 and 63.088 require publication of her name, 
description, location of conception and circumstances of 
conception in the newspaper; 
[F] is a single mother . . . in her thirties who has a substance abuse 
problem.  While ‘using’ she had sexual relations with a number of 
drug ‘dealers.’  She conceived a child but does not know the 
identity or whereabouts of the birth father.  Sections 63.087 and 
63.088 require publication of her name description, location of 
conception and circumstances of conception in newspaper. . . .36 
                                                          
 34. Although the Order on file is a redacted version, later news publications 
indicate that the minor in scenario “[B]” was thirteen years of age.  See Court to Hear 
Challenge to Florida’s ‘Scarlet Letter Law,’ L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at A25 
[hereinafter Court to Hear Challenge] (explaining that the appellate court will hear 
the case brought by various plaintiffs, one of which is “a girl who had sex with several 
classmates and conceived at age 13. . . .”). 
 35. As in the case of scenario “B”, although the Order on file was a redacted 
version, later news publications indicate that this plaintiff has slept with seven men 
and has no idea who the father might be.  See Sutton, supra note 22 (quoting 
plaintiffs’ attorney Charlotte Danciu). 
 36. Order, supra note 22, at 2-3. 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
Plaintiffs challenged the statute as a violation of their federal right 
to privacy and their right to be free from government intrusion in 
personal matters.37  This right has been interpreted to encompass and 
protect “fundamental interests in marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships and rearing of children.”38  
Further, the State of Florida has explicitly provided additional privacy 
protection within its constitution.39  According to the Florida 
Constitution, “[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and 
free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life as 
otherwise provided herein.”40  Florida courts interpret this language 
to include the right to make personal decisions such as whether to 
have an abortion and how to raise children.41 
In order to bring a challenge to a Florida statute as a violation of 
the state constitution, the plaintiff must first have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the matters under dispute.42  The state then 
has the burden of demonstrating that the statute “serves a compelling
                                                          
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . .”).  See, e.g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing for the first time 
that the right to privacy extends to matters surrounding an individual’s intimate 
relationships); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“For also fundamental is 
the right to be free . . . from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”); 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(highlighting the right to privacy in matters of intimate sexual behavior); Lawrence v. 
Texas, No. 02-102, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 26, 2003) (overruling Bowers and 
declaring that no legitimate state interest can “justify its intrusion into the personal 
and private life of the individual.”). 
 38. Motion, supra note 20, at 5.  See e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 
U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (noting that decisions regarding such personal decisions are 
protected and the government must not interfere without a justified reason). 
 39. See Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998) (noting that the Florida 
“constitutional right to privacy is much broader in scope, embraces more privacy 
interests, and extends more protection . . . than its federal counterpart”). 
 40. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (added 1980, amended 1998). 
 41. See Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 516-17 (upholding the parental right to decide 
whether to allow grandparent visitations); see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195 
(Fla. 1989) (upholding a minor’s right to decide whether to have an abortion without 
first having to obtain her parents’ consent). 
 42. See, e.g., Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 
1985) (determining whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy by 
analyzing whether the law reasonably recognizes an “individual’s legitimate 
expectation of privacy in financial institution records”). 
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state interest.”43  Finally, the state must prove that it “accomplishes its 
goal through the use of the least intrusive means.”44 
IV. HOLDING AND ANALYSIS 
As an introduction to its holding, the court outlined the State of 
Florida’s role as the “final guarantor[] of personal privacy.”45  The 
court noted that Florida’s constitution “embraces more privacy 
interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those 
interests, than does the federal Constitution.”46 
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In their Motion for Declaratory Judgment, plaintiffs identified two 
distinct areas in which women have a reasonable and justified 
expectation of privacy.  First, plaintiffs argued that in cases of sexual 
battery, information about the victim should be strictly confidential.47  
Second, plaintiffs argued that all information regarding adoptions is 
also strictly confidential.48  The court agreed, extending the 
fundamental and personal right of child rearing as defined in Y.H. v. 
F.L.H.,49 to the right to make decisions regarding adoption of a 
child.50  This was not a difficult decision; the right to privacy in 
personal matters is well established. 
                                                          
 43. See id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and In re Estate of 
Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980)). 
 44. Id. 
 45.  Order, supra note 22, at 7 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-
51 (1967)). 
 46. Id. at 8 (citing Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 544); see also id. (boasting that Florida 
is one of only four states, including Alaska, California, and Montana, to specifically 
guarantee the right to privacy within its state constitution). 
 47. Motion, supra note 20, at 7 (indicating that there are criminal penalties for a 
newspaper if it publishes an assault victim’s name); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 
(West 2003) (criminalizing the publication of any information that identifies the 
victim of a sexual offense). 
 48. Motion, supra note 20, at 7-8. 
 49. 784 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 50. Order, supra note 22, at 11 (“Clearly, there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding these [adoption] matters.”); see also Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood 
Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987) (recognizing that Supreme Court 
precedent encompasses autonomy and the right to make certain decisions). 
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B. Compelling State Interest 
The second determination by the court was whether a compelling 
state interest was served by the statutes in question.51  The court 
found that the goal of the statutes was to “provide notice to biological 
fathers so that they may both exercise their rights and accept their 
responsibilities with respect to their biological children. . . .”52  It is 
unclear how the court developed this interpretation of the statute.  
Yet from this goal, the court then identified two “compelling state 
interests”: 
First, there would certainly be a compelling state interest in 
strengthening and maintaining the bond between parent and child.  
Second, in those instances where the biological mother would need 
financial assistance from the state due to lack of support from the 
biological father, the notice provisions of the aforementioned 
statutes would reduce the financial burden on the state in each 
instance where a biological father comes forward and accepts his 
responsibility for financial support of the minor child.53 
Unfortunately, the Court provided no further explanation of why it 
identified only these two particular interests.  Further, the Court did 
not discuss the plaintiffs’ Motion arguing that the compelling state 
interest in this matter should be the “necessity to provide an 
unidentified and unlocated father with notice . . . [and] to protect the 
father’s state and federal constitutional right in determining the care 
and upbringing of his children free from governmental 
interference.”54 
The compelling interests stated in the Judge’s Order are 
inapplicable to the situation at issue.  For example, the unknown 
father, whose rights this law protects, may have had anonymous sex 
with a woman while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.55  Do we 
want to encourage this type of non-deliberate conception of children 
by protecting the biological father’s rights?  Further, would a man 
who has decided to have anonymous sex with a woman be interested 
in parenting a child from that interaction? 
                                                          
 51. Order, supra note 22, at 11. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Motion, supra note 20, at 8 (citing the Florida House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Judicial Oversight Analysis). 
 55. See Order, supra note 22, at 2-3 (noting that in at least three of the six 
plaintiffs’ scenarios, drugs or alcohol was involved before sex). 
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Then, in the second interest, there is no need for the biological 
father to decrease the financial burden of the biological mother, who 
is giving the child up for adoption.56  If the biological father wishes to 
oppose the adoption, there is a strong possibility he would receive 
custody.57  If the goal of the statutes is to give biological fathers the 
opportunity to exercise their parental rights,58 then surely a more 
reasonable compelling interest would be as plaintiffs stated, to give 
unknowing fathers the opportunity to parent their children.59  
However, the court did not discuss this in its opinion. 
Next, the court determined that the compelling state interests were 
not met in cases involving forced sexual battery.60  The court held 
that there is no compelling state interest justifying the publication 
requirements when conception was the result of non-consensual 
criminal conduct such as sexual battery or rape, with the exception of 
“sexual battery of a consensual nature where the crime is based only 
on the age of the victim.”61  To make this determination, the court 
cites various cases and other state statutes that preclude paternal 
rights and adoption challenges in instances of rape.62  Although the 
court extensively reviewed the statutory and forced rape laws both in
                                                          
 56. See id. at 11 (stating that there was a compelling interest to require biological 
fathers to become involved, in order that they would take responsibility for their 
offspring). 
 57. This statement is based on the assumption that the mother who already wishes 
to give her child up for adoption would not change her mind if the biological father 
suddenly came forward. 
 58. Compare Order, supra note 22, at 11 (stating that the goal of the Florida 
Adoption law is to give biological fathers the opportunity to exercise their rights or 
become responsible for their offspring), with Unsigned Letter, supra note 11, at 1 
(stating that the goal of Florida Adoption Act is to encourage finality in the adoption 
process). 
 59. If giving biological fathers the opportunity to parent were a reasonable 
“compelling state interest,” it would certainly fail to be the least intrusive means 
available.  In the case in which the father is completely unknown—in other words, he 
participated in a completely anonymous sexual encounter—it is unreasonable to 
think that he is looking to be a father, much less that he should receive constitutional 
protection. 
 60. See Order, supra note 22, at 14-15 (finding no compelling interest justifying 
the statutes’ publication requirements where the child was conceived out of “forced” 
or “non-consensual battery”). 
 61. See id. at 17 (distinguishing between two categories of cases: those that 
involve forced sexual battery; and those that either do not involve sexual battery, or 
that only involve sexual battery “of a consensual nature” based only on the age of the 
victim).  The court found the state’s interest was not compelling in the first category, 
but was sufficiently compelling in the latter.  Id. 
 62. See id. at 15-16 (noting that only a few states automatically terminate rights or 
eliminate notice requirements if the child was conceived as a result of sexual assault, 
but many states preclude parental rights in instances of violent rape). 
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Florida and other jurisdictions, it never rationalized why only the 
forced sexual battery scenarios did meet the compelling state interest 
test. 
C. Least Intrusive Means 
The third section of the Order discussed whether the statute was 
the least intrusive means available.  The court first states that “[t]he 
right to privacy in adoption in all aspects of an adoption proceedings 
[sic] is, thus, well established in this State.”63  The court ultimately 
holds that it “cannot find that the existing publication requirements 
contained within sections 63.087 and 63.088 do not accomplish their 
goal through the use of the least intrusive means.”64  Aside from the 
negative affirmative, the court’s holding is ambiguous because it bases 
its decision merely on the fact that there is no data or statistics on the 
success or failure rate of the notice requirements.65  The court did 
note that there was no evidence that the statutes were accomplishing 
the goals set forth above, but it refused to hold the statutes 
unconstitutional, without further evidence that less intrusive means 
would accomplish these goals.66 
Unfortunately, the court suffers from a lack of creativity.  One 
potentially less intrusive method of achieving the same goal would be 
a putative father registry.67  In fact, Senator Walter Campbell, the 
law’s primary sponsor, recently proposed such a registry for the State 
of Florida.68  Furthermore, it is possible that the needs of putative 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 18.  See also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989); 
Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Fla. 1987); Winfield v. 
Div. Of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985). 
 64. Order, supra note 22, at 19 (holding that it “cannot find that the existing 
publication requirements contained within sections 63.087 and 63.088 do not 
accomplish their goal through the use of the least intrusive means”).  But see de Vise, 
supra at note 2 (quoting plaintiffs’ attorney Charlotte Danciu who stated “[t]here’s so 
much potential harm that can come from this, and there are so many less intrusive 
ways of getting the message out. . . .”). 
 65. Order, supra note 22, at 19 (mentioning that there are other less intrusive 
means, such as only publishing initials of birth mothers, but disregarding these 
possibilities because “there is no data to establish that these alternative methods 
would be more or less effective than the existing notice requirements”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. “Putative father” has been defined as “a man who may be a child’s father, but 
who was not married to the child’s mother before the child was born and has not 
established the fact that he is the father in a court proceeding.”  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 50/12.1 (West 2003) (authorizing the Department of Children and Family 
Services to establish a putative father registry); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
50/12a (West 2003) (delineating the type of notice that must be given to putative 
fathers).  In fact, this has been recently proposed as a revision to the Florida statute.  
See  S. 2456, 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003). 
 68. See S. 2456, 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003). The bill creates a new section 
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fathers were not being met under the previous system, which merely 
required publishing the child’s date and place of birth.69  Although 
the “old” system may not have worked particularly well in cases in 
which the father is an ex-boyfriend, it is most likely at least as 
ineffective in the anonymous sexual partner situation. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
As Judge Blanc stated in his Order, there really is no concrete 
statistical data available on the effectiveness of these statutes.70  
However, anecdotal predictions abound.  “Adoption attorneys blame 
the law for a 17 percent decrease in adoptions statewide for the first 
half of 2002.”71  According to Charlotte Danciu, attorney for 
plaintiffs, many of her clients would and have had abortions, rather 
than go through the humiliating process of publishing their sexual 
history as required by this law.72  One client even told Danciu she 
“would have killed herself,” before publishing one of the notice 
petitions.73 
VI. THE APPEAL 
After the Order was issued, plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth District 
Court of Appeals.74  Oral arguments were held on February 20, 
2003.75  The Attorney General of Florida “intentionally failed to file a 
contesting brief”76 and the state’s lawyers refused to appear to defend 
the law.77  The Fourth District Court filed a ruling on April 23, 2003, 
                                                          
defining the rights of an “unmarried biological father” and specifically defines the 
related compelling state interest as follows: 
[A]n unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires 
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood . . . [and] the state has a 
compelling interest in requiring an unmarried biological father to 
demonstrate that commitment by providing appropriate medical care and 
financial support and by establishing legal paternity rights in accordance with 
the requirements of this chapter. 
Id. 
 69. No empirical data was available on this requirement either. 
 70. Order, supra note 22, at 19. 
 71. Peter Franceschina, ‘Scarlet Letter’ Law Discussed; State Doesn’t Contest 
Adoption Statute Challenge, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 2003, at 5B. 
 72. See Sutton, supra note 22 (stating that Danciu has estimated that about thirty 
of her clients have had abortions rather than publish their sexual histories). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Court to Hear Challenge, supra note 34. 
 75. Id. 
 76. G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 77. See Florida Court Strikes Down Adoption Posting Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
12
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss3/5
NEUFELD.DOC 11/24/2003  9:06 AM 
2002] IN RE: ADOPTION OF A MINOR CHILD 1211 
finding the statutes under the Florida Adoption Act 
unconstitutional.78  The Court struck down the challenged sections 
63.087 and 63.088, deciding that the “offending provisions 
substantially interfere” with a woman’s right to choose adoption and 
her right not to disclose the intimate details of her personal life that 
was required in the notice.79  Moreover, the Court declared that the 
state failed to demonstrate a compelling interest that outweighed the 
privacy rights of the mother and child to not be described in such a 
“personal, intimate, and intrusive manner.”80  Although the Court 
reversed the trial court ruling, it did not address any alternative 
proposals81 that were raised by the appellants. 
However, in accord with the judgment, lawmakers unanimously 
passed a bill to establish the “Florida Putative Father Registry.”82  The 
bill’s stated purpose is to “preserve the right to notice and consent to 
an adoption.”83  The confidential paternity registry requires men to 
register with the state if they believe they may be a father.84  The 
potential fathers would have to provide the name, address, and 
physical description of the mother as well as the date and place where 
conception could have taken place.85  Additionally, the men are 
notified if a woman they have specifically named in the registry has a 
baby up for adoption and a claim of paternity may be filed any time 
                                                          
2003, at A28 [hereinafter Florida Court Strikes Down Law] (reporting that the state’s 
lawyers did not agree with the heavily criticized adoption law). 
 78. See G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1061 (stating that the challenged sections violated the 
right to privacy guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Art. I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution). 
 79. See id. at 1062 (noting that invasion of both of these rights and interests are 
“so patent in this instance” that they did not require a case analysis to interpret the 
constitutional provision). 
 80. Id. at 1063 
 81. See S. 2456, 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003) (introducing, on March 19, 2003 
before the judgment was rendered, proposed revisions to the adoption statute that 
included the creation of a putative father registry); see also Jerry Berrios, Birth 
Mothers Regain Privacy in Adoptions, THE MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 2003, at 1B 
(reporting that Senator Campbell, the primary sponsor of the challenged statutes, 
introduced and supported the revisions because he realized that the statutes had 
“unintended consequences”). 
 82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West 2003) (detailing actions required by an 
unmarried biological father in order to establish parental rights).  See, e.g., Lloyd 
Dunkelberger, Legislators look to cut ‘Scarlet Letter’ law, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, 
Apr. 13, 2003, at BS1 (providing a thorough explanation about the paternity registry 
and statistics of whether the new law will be effective). 
 83. See § 63.054(1). 
 84. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0541 (West 2003) (explaining that the information 
given by the potential father will be kept by the Office of Vital Statistics in the 
Department of Health and is “confidential and exempt from public disclosure”). 
 85. See § 63.054(3). 
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prior to the child’s birth.86  However, potential fathers cannot file 
with the registry if the mother has already begun the process to 
terminate the father’s parental rights.87 
On May 30, 2003, Governor Jeb Bush signed the bill supporting the 
paternity registry noting that the bill imposes a certain level of 
responsibility on the father.88  After Governor Bush officially repealed 
the “Scarlet Letter” law by signing the new bill, Lieutenant Governor 
Toni Jennings announced the official demise of the law to the Florida 
Adoption Council members, who in response gave a standing 
ovation.89 
Although the Court’s decision and the lawmakers’ actions came as 
little surprise, Florida women expressed a general feeling of 
vindication and relief.90  Adoption attorneys and civil rights groups 
labeled the appellate decision a “huge victory for women.”91  
Moreover, Charlotte Danciu, attorney for the appellants, was ecstatic 
with the Court’s decision saying that it was a “great day for adoptions” 
and it dissipated the humiliation birth moms were subjected to under 
the “Scarlet Letter law.”92 
                                                          
 86. See § 63.054(1), (7) (establishing that when a mother begins an adoption 
proceeding she must contact and provide the same information requested from the 
men to the Office of Vital Statistics allowing the Office to conduct a diligent search of 
the registry to find a possible match for a father). 
 87. See § 63.054(1). 
 88. See Randolph Pendleton, Bush Signs Bill Repealing ‘Scarlet Letter Law,’ 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 31, 2003, at B5 (discussing lawmakers’ positive opinions 
regarding the paternity registry).  Representative Mark Mahon from Jacksonville also 
supported the bill saying it puts the responsibility where it should be, the father, who 
should volunteer rather than requiring the mother to try to locate someone who may 
not want to be found.  Id. 
 89. See Sherri Ackerman, Florida Adoption Officials Applaud Bush Veto of 
“Scarlet Letter Law,” TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 31, 2003, at 7 (describing the success and 
happiness among adoption officials for the repeal of the “Scarlet Letter law”). 
 90. See Florida Court Strikes Down Law, supra note 77 (quoting ACLU attorney, 
Mariann Wang, expressing, “A lot of women’s lives and children’s lives have been on 
hold for all this time, so it’s a wonderful thing that women’s rights have finally been 
vindicated and protected.”). 
 91. See Susan Spencer-Wendel, Court: Moms Needn’t List Partners to Pick 
Adoption, THE PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 24, 2003, at 1A (indicating that the “Scarlet 
Letter law” had a “chilling effect” and only served to humiliate women). 
 92. See Berrios, supra note 81 (noting the elated reactions from various 
lawmakers and adoption officials about the repeal of the law); see also supra notes 72-
73 and accompanying text (explaining the embarrassment women faced with the 
choice that they must publish their intimate personal information). 
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CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of adoption laws is not to find babies for 
parents who want them but rather to locate stable homes for children 
while still protecting the rights of every party involved.  The paternity 
registry gives lawmakers a second chance to protect the mother’s 
privacy, preserve a father’s parental claims, and maintain the adoptive 
parents’ rights to care for a child.  Further, the bill allows Florida to 
effectuate useful adoption laws and closes an embarrassing chapter in 
the state’s legislative history.  However, regardless of the final 
outcome, it is frustrating that lawmakers are willing to deprive women 
of the right to privacy in matters as personal as sexual experiences.  
Finally, it is disturbing that in the year 2003, lawmakers are willing to 
cast the same sort of wrath and humiliation on unwed mothers that 
the Puritans cast on Hester Prynne in The Scarlet Letter, written in 
1850.93 
JENNAFER NEUFELD 
DALIA GEORGI 
                                                          
 93. See HAWTHORNE, supra note 2, at 220-21 (describing the scarlet letter that 
Hester Prynne was forced to wear: “[w]herever her walk hath been,—wherever, so 
miserably burdened, she may have hoped to find repose,—it hath cast a lurid gleam 
of awe and horrible repugnance roundabout her.”). 
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